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COMMENTS
THE RULE IN SHELLEY'S CASE IN WASHINGTON
As a state grows in age and the accumulations of private capital
within its boundaries increase in size and number, problems of future
interests in property law become of greater importance. Propertied
individuals seek to extend control over their accumulations beyond
their deaths, whether wisely or not is here unimportant. Washington is
reaching this stage of maturity and its lawyers consequently will be
more frequently confronted with the difficulties in creation of future
interests.
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
One of the major pitfalls facing the lawyer in this field is the
rule in Shelley's Case which by its operation defeats the effort of a
transferor to continue his dominance over the devolution of his prop-
erty.1 There is no question that the rule did not first arise in the case
from which its name is taken.2 Probably the best short statement of
the rule was made by defendant's counsel in the case itself:' "... it is
a rule in law when the ancestor, by any gift or conveyance, takes an
estate of freehold, and in the same gift or conveyance an estate is
limited, either mediately or immediately, to his heirs in fee or in tail;
that always in such cases 'the heirs' are words of limitation of the
estate, and not words of purchase." 4
That Washington is just reaching the stage wherein widespread at-
tempts at domination of property interests are to be expected is
evidenced by the present paucity of cases wherein the rule is con-
sidered or applied. The writer has found but four.
The first is Shufeldt v. Shufeldt5 wherein appears the following
paragraph,
"It is thought that the rule in Shelley's Case, which as a
principle of common law is in force in this state, sustains the
contention that the remainder under discussion could not be a
vested remainder. That arises from a misunderstanding of the
rule in Shelley's Case."8
This is followed by a statement of the rule:
"Under the rule in Shelley's Case, if an estate for life is
granted by an instrument and the remainder is limited by the
same instrument either mediately or immediately, to the
heirs of the life tenant, the life tenant takes the remainder as
well as the life estate. '"
'The operative effect of the rule is usually stated, "The rule defeats
the testator's intention." The annotator in Note (1911) 29 L. R. A. (N. S.)
963, "The Rule in Shelley's Case," takes exception to this statement. Rather
it is the particular or special intent that is defeated, the annotator explains,
but not the general intent. The use of such language is confusing. In
ordinary discussion of the problem it seems certain that to limit the
estate of the "first taker" to one for life is the transferor's primary intent,
if not his only one, except the intent that certain persons in a designated
relation to the first taker will take what remains after the first taker's
share. The general intent is explained to mean the desire of the testator
that the property should go by inheritance in indefinite succession. This
purpose the rule's operation achieves. But query, is this ordinarily the
intent of the testator?
'See discussion in V, "Antiquity of the Rule," in 29 L. R. A. (hr. s.) 977
et seq.
'1 Coke 93b (1581)-as stated in 29 L. R. A. (N. s.) 969.
'A mdre elaborate statement of the rule is presented in 29 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 974, n. 20, quoted from 4 K=', ConvmNrAlmus (13th ed. 1884) 215.
ChancellorKent's words are: "When a person takes an estate of freehold,
legally or equitably, under a deed, will, or other writing, and in the same
instrument there is a limitation by way of remainder, either with or with-
out the interposition of another estate, of an interest of the same legal or
equitable quality, to his heirs or heirs of his body, as a class of persons to
take in succession from generation to generation, the limitation to the
heirs entitles the ancestor to the whole estate."
5130 Wash. 253, 227 Pac. 6 (1924).
'id. at 268.
-ibid.
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Of the discussion of the rule in the Shufeldt case, the court in the
'second case, Fowler v. Wyman,8 explains,
"Counsel for appellants say that our recognition in Shufeldt
v. Shiteldt... of the rule in question was 'pure obiter dictum'.
No need of any controversy about that. They admit that the
question of the validity of the rule is in this case, and we take
occasion to say now that the rule is a rule of decision in this
state because of the common law and the provisions of REm.
COM1T. STAT. (1922) § 143."1
The most recent decision in which the rule is applied is Fowler v.
Lanpher.1° As there can be little question of the court's position in
the two earlier cases that in fact the rule is part of the common law
of Washington, this discussion henceforth will be primarily of the appli-
cation of the rule to the facts in the Lanpher case.1"
In that case Mrs. Fanny E. Fowler transferred certain property to
the Everett Trust and Savings Bank as trustee under an agreement
which contained the following provision (alone important for the
purpose of this discussion):
"Upon the death of the party of the first part, the trustee
shall divide all that remains of said trust estate (and for the
purpose of making such division shall have the authority if it
deems best to reduce the same or any portion of it to cash)
into six equal parts and deliver and-pay over one of such parts
to my son, Alger Fowler, if he be living, or to his heirs if he
be dead .. ."
with similar provisions for each of her other five children.12
The action was by the settlor, Mrs. Fowler, and her six children to
cancel or revoke the trust. Grandchildren who had attained their
'169 Wash. 307, 13 P. (2d) 501 (1932).
lid. at 308-309.
Ev Rv. STAT. (1932) § 143: "The common law, so far as it is not in-
consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, or of the
state of Washington, nor incompatible with the institutions and condition
of society in this state, -shall be the rule of decision in all the courts of
this state."
It is probable that the Shufeldt case discussion of the rule was dictum,
because in that case the court was able to find a vested remainder in the
taker who would have had to be the ancestor under the rule without the
necessity of application of the rule. The Wyman case, however, clearly
presented the question. In the latter case a conveyance recited in the
granting words, "... . said property to be vested in her during her life-
time, and at her death to be the property of the heirs of her body. Said
property not transferable during her lifetime." The habendum clause of
the deed was in the ordinary form with no restrictions. The action was
by heirs of the grantee against the transferee of the grantee. The defend-
ant prevailed on the court's reasoning that the rule in Shelley's Case vested
the remainder in the grantee, leaving nothing with which the plaintiffs
in the case could argue.
10193 Wash. 308, 75 P. (2d) 132 (1938).
"'The problem arose under an action for the revocation of a trust. The
writer is not here concerned with the correctness of the revocation, which
was permitted, but only with the use of the rule in Shelley's Case in the
process. Two trusts were involved, but only the second result, under the
Fanny E. Fowler trust, was explained by use of the rule. Consequently the
first portion of the opinion concerning the other trust is not here pertinent.21193 Wash. 308, 313, 75 P. (2d) 132, 134 (1938).
19401
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majorities joined as parties plaintiff and those under age were joined
as defendants by guardian ad litem. The trustee appealed from an
order revoking the trust on the grounds that there might be an out-
standing contingent interest in the grandchildren and consequently
all interested parties had not sought revocation. The court answered
thus: 3
"Respondent's contention that the grandchildren have a
contingent interest in the trust estate cannot be sustained. The
trust agreement makes a definite provision for the divi-
sion of the property and designates just who shall have the
divided shares. It makes no provision for grandchildren unless
one of the children dies before death of the maker of the trust
agreement.
"In Burton v. Boren, 308 II. 440, 139 N. E. 868, 869, it
was said: 'Where a grantor conveys a life estate with a re-
mainder over to his heirs, the heirs do not take a remainder
at all. [Italics by writer.] The word "heirs" will be regarded
as defining or limiting the estate which the first taker has. In
such case the heirs would take as reversioners by descent from
the grantor and not under the deed.'
"The rule in Shelley's Case is a part of the law of this state.
Fowler v. Wyman ...
"In Shujeldt v. Shufeldt . . . the rule was stated to be as
follows . . . [quoting the same statement previously set out
herein].
"Applying the rule we find that the grandchildren are not
interested parties in the trust agreement and their consent is
not necessary in order to compel its termination."
A careful reading of the words of the court above quoted will dis-
close that two rules of property are stated. The situations to which the
rules apply can be illustrated thus: A to B for life, remainder to B's
heirs (rule in Shelley's Case); and, A to B for life, remainder to A's
heirs (rule as to remainder to grantor's heirs). Although the court
quotes the rule in Shelley's Case the language still does not make clear
which of the two rules is being applied.1 4 If the rule relating to con-
veyance of a remainder to the grantor's heirs is the one to which the
court has reference, it is inapposite here. There is no limitation to the
'lid. at 319.
14The rule quoted from Burton v. Boren is not the same as the rule in
Shelley's Case. There is this vital distinction: in the Burton case the re-
mainder over is limited to heirs of the grantor, not of the grantee. Under
the rule in Shelley's Case the estate is granted to the grantee and the
remainder is limited to the grantee's heirs. Under the first case the rule
applied leaves a reversion in the grantor after the expiration of the
granted estate-in this instance, a life estate. Under the rule in Shelley's
Case, the grantor is out of the picture entirely, so far as application of
the rule is concerned. The reasoning of the court follows that used by
plaintiff's attorneys in their reply brief. The distinction between the
rule applied in the Burton case and the rule in Shelley's Case is clearly
discussed in Sn'ms, THE LAW OF FuTuRE INTERESTS (1936) c. 8, § 148 particu-
larly, in which there is a footnote citation to the Burton case. See also
Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N. Y. 305, 122 N. E. 221 (1919). In New York the rule
in Shelley's Case is abrogated by statute but the court nevertheless ap-
plied the other rule.
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heirs, as such, of Mrs. Fowler, the grantor-settlor in this case. The
argument in the briefs 5 was to the effect that no matter who took,
either the six children or surviving grandchildren (children of a de-
ceased child), the takers would be heirs of the "grantor" (Mrs. Fow-
ler), and therefore the rule in Shelley's Case would be operative and
the remainder to the heirs would be vested in the grantor. Thus were
the two rules entangled.
But assuming the argument was based on the rule relating to con-
veyance to the grantor's heirs, the rule is here inapplicable because the
alternative takers, should one of the children die before Mrs. Fowler,
were heirs of the deceased child who were not necessarily grandchildren
of Mrs. Fowler. It needs no citation of authority to demonstrate that
heirs of a child might not be heirs of the parent. Under Washington
law, for example, the surviving, spouse is an heir, but it is clear that
such son-in-law or daughter-in-law would not be an heir of Mrs. Fowler.
If, on the other hand, the rule in Shelley's Case is the one actually
applied by the court, the case is unique in its application. An analysis
of the characteristics of the interests created by the trust instrument
will demonstrate that the rule was misapplied.
First, the trust instrument created an equitable life estate in the
settlor, Mrs. Fowler, which is followed by the remainders the court
found to be extinguished by the application of the rule.1 6 Second, the
instrument created a remainder in the six children, determination of
the nature of which is a problem, but probably it is vested.' 7 The re-
mainder, if vested, is subject to defeasance if the child does not survive
the parent the language being, " . .. to my son ... if he be living, or
to his heirs if he be dead.. ." Third, if the child is dead, the remainder
interest goes to the heirs of the deceased child. The exact nature of
this interest is equally difficult of determination.
'
5Appellants' Reply Brief, pp. 29-34.
"Whether the remainders are legal or equitable would be important
if the rule is to operate on the interest given the six children rather than
the heirs of the children. If the interests in remainder are legal the rule
could not operate thereon because of the fourth requisite quoted in the
Shufeldt case at p. 269, from Beals v. Davis, 241 Ill. 536, 89 N. E. 706, 29
L. R. A. (Nf. s.) 937 (1909): "... . fourth, the estates must be of the same
quality-that is, both legal or both equitable'." See also Chancellor Kent's
statement of the rule quoted Note 4, supra. But it seems certain that the
court did not intend to abolish the remainders to the children by use of
the rule, because their remainders did not go to "heirs" and that requisite
is clearly stated in the Shufeldt case on the same page; and further the
court at p. 320 of the Larnpher case said,
'It is our opinion that those interested in the Fanny Fowler trust
were Mrs. Fowler and her living children and all being of age and com-
petent were entitled to have her trust determined." (Italics supplied.)
For these reasons the writer believes the court referred to the interests
given to the heirs of the children when it stated that applying the rule
the grandchildren were not found to be interested parties.
Iv'he Washington test seems to be that quoted from the Shufeldt case,
130 Wash. 253, 262, 227 Pac. 6, 9 (1924), in the opinion In re Elvigen's Estate,
191 Wash. 614, 618, 71 P. (2d) 672 (1937):
"'If, when the will goes into effect there is no contingency either as to
the person entitled to the remainder or as to the event by which the
intermediate estate is to be determined then the remainder is vested."'
The test is further stated on p. 269 of the Shufeldt case, ". . . the re-
mainder to Edwin Hughes was certain as to identity of the remainderman
.L9401
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The interest given to the heirs of a child predeceasing the settlor the
court apparently classified as a remainder over after the interest
of the child, which remainder vested in the child by operation of the
rule in Shelley's Case. But the interest of the child of the settlor was
a fee simple in remainder, and the court's approach runs afoul the
principle that there can be no remainder after a fee.' 8 The only possible
explanation of the interest of the heirs of the child, upon this analysis,
is that it is an executory interest,19 and to this type of interest the rule
in Shelley's Case does not apply.20 Under this analysis the rule in Shel-
ley's Case has been used to destroy an executory interest, generally be-
lieved to be indestructible. This effect has not been given the rule in
any other case found nor has this effect been suggested by any of the
authorities examined. The contrary is the usual position.2
It is also possible to interpret the limitations after the equitable life
estate as alternative contingent remainders. If the interest of the
child is contingent upon his survival of the parent, Mrs. Fowler, it is
therefore a contingent remainder, but still a remainder in fee simple.
The interest to the heirs of the child then is alternative, taking the
place of the child's interest after the life estate of Mrs. Fowler, not
after the interest of the child. The rule that there can be no remainder
after a remainder in fee is still applicable. The language of the trust
agreement is: "to my son . . . if he be living, or to his heirs if he be
dead . . ." (italics supplied). This wording supports such a construc-
tion for the use of the disjunctive imports substitution, not succession.
and he was capable and competent to take possession and enter into the
enjoyment thereof the moment the prior estates would determine. It was
therefore a vested remainder."
It is possible to consider the remainder contingent because of the pro-
vision "upon the death of the party of the first part" appearing in the
trust instrument, but a somewhat similar argument in the Shufeldt case
was rejected. It seems possible to consider the remainder as vested sub-ject to defeasance by a condition subsequent and thereby classify it as is
done in the RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1936) § 157; and see PovEmL, CASES ON
FUTURE INTERESTS, (2d ed. 1937) 44 et seq.
""It is clear that there can be no remainder after a vested remainder
in fee simple." Snvms, op. cit. supra note 14, § 75.
1""Where there are limitations in the alternative and the first gift is to
an ascertained person and in form unconditional followed by a condition
subsequent in form, the great weight of American authority is to the
effect that the first gift is a vested remainder and the second is an execu-
tory interest." From a discussion of limitations in the alternative in
America, SnMEs, op. cit. supra note 14, § 79. The difficulty is, of course,
whether the requirement for survival is a condition subsequent or prece-
dent.
""The rule in Shelley's Case is not applicable to executory limitations,
because the limitation to the ancestor and to the heirs, if they were both
of them executory limitations, would not be parts of the same estate, but
would be distinct and independent dispositions of the subject." Note (1911)
29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 963, 1011.
"See, e. g., note 20, supra; and Snvms, op. cit. supra note 14, §§ 97, 98 in
c. 6, Contingent Remainders Distinguished from Executory Interests, par-
ticularly at p. 165 which reads:
"Another point of difference is that a remainder to the heirs of a
person to whom a preceding estate of freehold is given by the same
instrument calls for the application of the rule in Shelley's Case, while an
executory interest limited to the heirs of a person who has a preceding
estate of freehold does not."
[VOL. 15
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Rephrased the limitations over would be: "To my son in fee if he be
living at the time of my death or, in the alternative, to my son's heirs
if he predecease me."
Upon this reasoning there would be alternative contingent remainders
in fee simple (1) to the child or (2) to his heirs. Neither the rule
in Shelley's Case nor the rule relative to remainders limited to the
heirs of the grantor applies to such limitations. There would still be
nothing upon which the rule in Shelley's Case could operate, because the
heirs would not be taking by inheritance from the child, but in place
of the child, from the settlor-grantor of the trust agreement.22 The
rule in Shelley's Case is applied only to cases in which there is a re-
mainder limited to the heirs of the first taker; here the first taker (Mrs.
Fowler's child) takes in fee, if he takes at all, to the exclusion of his
heirs. The rule relative to remainders limited to heirs of the grantor
does not apply because the alternative remainder here is limited to
heirs of the grantor's child, not to the heirs of the grantor.
A failure upon the part of counsel and the court to distinguish be-
tween the two common law rules relative to limitations of remainder
interests to heirs and a failure properly to ascertain the character of
interests arising under the limitations here presented seem to have led
the court into statements and a result which indicate that executory
interests occupy a precarious position under the law of this state, al-
though their indestructibility has been continuously recognized in Eng-
land and in this country since Pells v. Brown28 which was decided in
1620.
Another aspect of the rule in Shelley's Case should be considered.
Not infrequently statements are made that the rule does not apply to
devises by will because of the rule that the intention of the testator
governs. If the analysis of the annotator in 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 963 is
accepted, this distinction in application is unwarranted because the
rule doesn't defeat the intention. In re Johnson's Estate,24 the fourth
Washington case mentioning the rule, contains dictum on this point.
In certain states, says the court,25 the rule in Shelley?s Case has been
abolished by statute and in others by judicial decision:
"It does not necessarily follow from the decision in Fowler
v. Wyman that the rule applies to devises in wills, in view of
REmr. REv. STAT. § 141026 and especially in view of § 141527 in
2-There is the further possibility that the rule should not be applied in
any event here because the trust concerned in part, at least, personal
property. This possibility is of little weight, however, because although
by its terms the rule in Shelley's Case is applicable only to realty, by
analogy it is frequently applied to personalty.
"Cro. Jac. 590, 79 Eng. Reprints 504.
1192 Wash. 439, 73 P. (2d) 755 (1937)..
"192 Wash. 439, 445-6, 73 P. (2d) 755 (1937).
wRrnr. 1Ev. STAT. (1933) § 1410: "If any person, by last will, devise any
real estate to any person for the term of such person's life, such devise
vests in the devisee an estate for life, and without the remainder is spe-
cially devised, it shall revert to the heirs at law of the testator."
2Rnvr. 1,Ev. STAT. (1933) § 1415: "All courts and others concerned in the
execution of last wills shall have due regard to the direction of the will,
and the true intent and meaning of the testator, in all matters brought
before them."
19401
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which the courts are enjoined to have due regard to the true
intent of the testator in carrying out and executing wills. On
the other hand, the reasons given in Fowler v. Wyman for
holding the rule not 'incompatible with the institutions and
condition of society in this state,' would seem to apply as
fully to devises by will as to conveyances by deed. We need
not, however, determine that question in this case . . ."
In conclusion it seems clear that the rule in Shelley's Case is applic-
able in Washington at least to conveyances by deed. The Lanpher case
apparently is authority that it is applicable to trust agreements, and
although the court expressly refuses to decide the question in In re
Johnson's Estate, supra, the dictum therein is about as strong as pos-
sible without a direct holding that the rule is applicable to devises
by will.
An understanding of the operation of the rule and a study of its
elements make it clear that avoiding its usual operation is not an un-
surmountable difficulty, but the common confusion as to the purpose
and operation of the rule makes advisable its statutory abrogation.
This has been attempted in at least 32 states and the District of
Columbia 28 , although the effectiveness of the attempts has been ques-
tioned.29 A writer in the FORDHAM LAW REvIEw2 0 praises the statute of
West Virginia, stating it "constitutes as perfect a model as could be
desired" and sets it out in full.21 A later proposal is embodied in the
Law of Property Act, Proposed Final Draft No. 1.2 Section 12 there-
of reads:
"The Rule in Shelley's Case Abolished. Whenever any
person by conveyance, takes a life interest and in the same
conveyance an interest is limited by way of remainder, either
mediately or immediately, to his heirs, or the heirs of his body,
or his issue, or next of kin, or some of such heirs, heirs of the
body, issue, or next of kin, the words 'heirs,' 'heirs of the
body,' 'issue' or 'next of kin,' or other words of like import
-"See Legis. (1935) 4 FomHAvm L. Rzv. 316, 320, n. 39, for citations to the
statutes.
"Legis., The Rule in Shelley's Case Has Been Abolished-Sed Quaere.
(1935) 4 FoRDmHM L. REV. 316.
"ibid.
"W. VA. CODE (1931) c. 36, art. 1, § 14 (as quoted id. p. 326): "Wherever
any person, by deed, will, or other writing, takes an estate of freehold in
land, or takes such an estate in personal property, as would be an estate
of freehold, if it were an estate in land, and in the same deed, will, or
writing, an estate is afterwards limited by way of remainder, either
mediately or immediately, to his heirs, or the heirs of his body, or his
issue, the words 'heirs', 'heirs of his body', and 'issue' or other words of
like import used in the deed, will or other writing in the limitation therein
by way or [sic.-of?] remainder, shall not be construed as words of limita-
tion carrying to such person the inheritance as to the land, or the absolute
estate as to the personal property, but they shall be construed as words of
purchase, creating a remainder in the heirs, heirs of the body, or issue; it
being the intent and purpose of this section to completely abolish the rule
of law known as the Rule in Shelley's Case."
"April 2, 1938-a proposal by The American Law Institute drafted in
cooperation with the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws.
[VOL.. 15
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used in the conveyance, in the limitation carrying to such
person any estate of inheritance or absolute estate in the
property, are words of purchase creating a remainder in
the designated heirs, heirs of the body, issue, or next of kin."
The other problem discussed herein in connection with the Lanpher
case is met by Section 15 of the proposed law, which reads:
"Inter Vivos Conveyance to the Heirs or Next of Kin of
the Conveyor. When any property is limited, in an otherwise
effective conveyance inter vivos, in form or in defect [sic.--ef-
fect?], to the heirs or next of kin of the conveyor, which con-
veyance creates one or more prior interests in favor of a per-
son or persons in existence, such conveyance operates in favor
of such heirs or next of kin by purchase and not by descent."
Until there is effective statutory abrogation of both rules in Wash-
ington, it would appear that attorneys preparing instruments for prop-
ertied clients in this jurisdiction would be wise to make a study of the
rules and then to steer a course far from them.
If only the rule in Shelley's Case were to be abolished, the West
Virginia statute seems better, for the two sections of the proposed uni-
form law quoted above need the help of other, definitive sections to
operate fully and effectively. In any event, the Washington cases
illustrate in this instance, as in other real property problems, the need
for careful legislative treatment of the matter.
HARRY M. CRoss.
DOES THE LAW REQUIRE A USELESS ACT?
PARCHEN V. ROWLEY
Conditions, super-imposed upon the terms of a contract by law, pre-
sent some complex problems. This comment aims to point out one
small but important and recurrent factual situation in which proper
argument and presentation are vital in order that the correct theory of
action or defense may be accurately defined. We postulate a contract
for the sale of land, S to convey upon final payment. Since the contract
has fixed the same date for final payment and for conveyance, the law
makes these promises dependent one upon the other through the opera-
tion of constructive conditions. Normally neither party can put the
other in default without a seasonable tender of his own performance'.
'Reese v. Westfield, 56 Wash. 415, 105 Pac. 837 (1909), 28 L. R. A. (x. S.)
956 (1910); Carter v. Miller, 155 Wash. 14, 283 Pac. 470 (1929); Stusser v.
Gottstein, 178 Wash. 360, 35 P. (2d) 5 (1934). The above statement should
be qualified to include the situation where a period of time has elapsed
which is sufficiently long to be deemed a material failure of performance
on the part of the vendee so that the vendor's promise to convey is ex-
cused. Similarly, the duty of payment would also be excused and the
contract regarded as dead simply because of the passage of time during
which both parties failed to act upon it. Virtue v. Stanley, 87 Wash. 167,
151 Pac. 270 (1915); REsTATEmEnm, CoNTRACTs (1932) §§ 274, 276.
19401
